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Abstract
This paper challenges the conventional wisdom that giving voters more
power–both formally through the use of more “open” electoral systems and
informally through easier access to information on politicians’ wrongdoings–
will necessarily result in them voting corrupt politicians out of office. Fo-
cusing on a comparison between closed-list and open-list proportional rep-
resentation systems, we theoretically show that opening the lists is likely
to generate a large shift of vote shares in favor of the traditional, most
corrupt parties. We design a survey experiment to test these predictions
in Paraguay and find strong supporting evidence. We do not find in our
context that the lack of information is a major obstacle preventing vot-
ers from voting out corrupt politicians; if anything, under the more open
system, supporters of the incumbent party tend to cast more votes for
politicians with a recent history of corruption.
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1 Introduction
Corruption is a major threat to economic and social development.1 It has the
power to erode trust in political institutions, undermining the stability of po-
litical systems.2 Among the many remedies suggested, electoral democracy is
often mentioned as a way to generate a better selection of politicians and to dis-
cipline them by creating incentives for reelection (Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman
(2005); Ferraz and Finan (2008)). However, the literature has also established
that democracy is no panacea and that, depending on the context, it is not nec-
essarily conducive to less corruption (Stephenson (2015)). By and large, in many
democracies, voters tend to elect and reelect corrupt politicians.3
To explain this puzzle of a regular reelection of corrupt politicians in democ-
racies, the attention has shifted to studying conditions, which, combined with
democracy, are necessary for voters to effectively exercise control over corrupt
politicians. In particular, two important factors have been identified: (i) electoral
institutions and (ii) voters’ information.
Regarding the role of electoral institutions, the basic idea is that those that
give voters more formal control over individual candidates, such as primaries in
majoritarian systems or open-lists rather than closed-lists in proportional repre-
sentation systems, grant voters more effective power over candidates. In addition,
even if the electoral institutions formally allow voters to punish corrupt individ-
uals, voters may still lack the relevant information to exercise this control in
practice, either for external reasons (lack of access or absence of free press) or
internal reasons (memory limitations, cognitive biases). Providing voters with
more information should help them identify the corrupt politicians and “punish”
them.
1 See Olken and Pande (2012) for a review of the related large body of work.
2 Lagunes (2012), Rose-Ackerman (1999), Rose-Ackerman (2005), Seligson (2002),
Anderson and Tverdova (2003).
3 Within democracies, many studies have examined the effects of corruption charges
on electoral performance across a variety of countries and institutional settings.
Almost all of them find null or very modest effects (Peters and Welch (1980);
McCann and Dominguez (1998); Winters and Weitz-Shapiro (2012); Bagenholm
(2013)).
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In this paper, we challenge this conventional wisdom that giving voters more
formal power–through more “open” electoral systems–and more information about
politicians’ wrongdoings will necessarily result in them voting corrupt politicians
out of office. We focus on the comparison between closed- and open-list pro-
portional representation (PR) systems. The two systems are quite similar in
that they both involve party lists with PR, but they vary in the degree to which
they allow voters to express preferences about individual candidates. In prac-
tice, there is a wide variety of open-list systems, which themselves differ in how
much formal power they give to voters. In particular, they differ with respect
to the maximal number of candidate votes a voter is allowed to cast: it can
be one (e.g., Sweden and Denmark), some fixed number larger than one (e.g.,
post-WWII Italy, where the maximum number of votes was three or four), or
unlimited (e.g., Latvia). In this paper, we focus on the open-list system that
gives the voters the maximum possibility to express themselves (and avoid po-
tential coordination problems): we study, both theoretically and experimentally,
an open-list system in which voters can vote for any number of candidates on
the list, without any constraint. We make three main contributions.
First, we contribute to the theoretical debate about voters’ formal control
by highlighting a thus far neglected countervailing effect of open-list systems.
The conventional argument in favor of open-list systems as a remedy against
corruption is that voters, when voting for a list in an open-list system, can also
express their preferences over the individual candidates on this list–a possibility
absent in a closed-list system. This argument implicitly assumes that voters
vote for the same parties under both systems (this is a “within-list” argument).
We propose a theoretical model of voter behavior in closed- and open-list PR
systems that explicitly models both the (within-list) candidate vote choice (in
the open-list system) and the between-party vote choice (in both systems). We
show that moving from a closed-list system to an open-list system is likely to
increase the vote shares of the incumbent parties, which are likely to be the most
corrupt. The intuition for this novel “between-list” effect is as follows. Opening
the lists is more beneficial to lists that exhibit candidates over which voters have
strong preferences. Indeed, if all candidates on a list look ‘neutral’ to a voter,
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she will not be more likely to vote for this list under the open-list system than
under the closed-list system. The option to exercise the formal power given by
open-lists has higher value for lists featuring not only candidates that the voters
strongly like but also candidates that the voters strongly dislike. In a similar
vein, opening the lists will also be more beneficial for lists whose candidates are
well-known to the voters (again, either as good or bad).4 In many contexts,
candidates running for large, incumbent parties are generally better known by
voters and are likely to generate stronger feelings. Our theoretical findings imply
that incumbent parties are likely to get higher vote shares–and thus more seats–
when opening the lists. These incumbent parties happen to often be the most
corrupt, thus the negative impact on corruption.
Second, we test our main prediction in a survey conducted in Paraguay, in-
cluding 2,641 individuals, 1,547 in the capital city Asuncio´n and 1,094 in a rural
area called Caaguazu´. Respondents were asked to take part in two hypothet-
ical elections, one under closed-list PR and one under open-list PR, featuring
the same party lists they faced in the previous senatorial election. Paraguay is
an institutionally weak democratic country ranked consistently among the most
corrupt in Latin America. It is an interesting country to study since it currently
uses a closed-list PR system to elect its members of the Senate, but there is
an ongoing debate about a potential electoral reform to open the lists. Inter-
estingly, one of the main arguments put forward by advocates of the open-list
reform is its expected ability to tackle corruption. Consistent with our theo-
retical predictions, we find a large shift in vote shares towards the incumbent
party at the expense of smaller parties when lists are opened, even though this
incumbent party is widely perceived as corrupt by voters. When opening the
lists, the fraction of participants voting for the incumbent increases by between
6 or 7 percentage points (a 13 percent relative increase), with a same magnitude
drop in the number of voters voting for the smaller parties with candidates less
4 Our model shares similarities with that of Blumenau, Eggers, Hangartner, and
Hix (2017), who propose a model of voting under closed-list and open-list systems,
showing that the latter is likely to benefit parties with more internal disagreement
on key issues. They study a case where voters can only cast one candidate vote
under the open-list PR system, but the intuition is similar.
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well-known to the public (which represents a 28 percent relative drop).
Third, our survey allows us to evaluate in this Paraguayan context the as-
sumption lying at the basis on the conventional argument in favor of opening the
lists, namely, that under the open-list system, voters would use the additional
formal power granted by this electoral institution to vote against corrupt politi-
cians, especially when they have good information about these politicians’ past
wrongdoings. Before the respondents were invited to vote in the hypothetical
election featuring the candidates who ran in the previous 2013 Senate election,
we randomized information reminding them about a highly publicized corruption
scandal involving 23 of these politicians. Studying votes for individual candidates
under the open-list system, we find that our information treatments have little
to no impact on vote choice. We interpret this null result as suggesting that the
lack of information is not the main obstacle preventing voters from voting against
corrupt politicians when given a chance. We even provide suggestive evidence
that, if anything, supporters of the incumbent party tend to give more votes to
politicians involved in the corruption scandal.
Taken together, our results challenge the optimistic view that voters’ infor-
mation and formal control are necessarily helpful tools when fighting corruption.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews
in more detail the literature on the impact of democratic institutions and voters’
information on corruption and highlights our specific contributions. In Section
3, we lay out a model of voter behavior in closed- and open-list PR systems
and derive testable predictions. Section 4 describes the Paraguayan setting, and
Section 5 details our experimental and survey design. We discuss the results in
Section 6. The last section concludes.
2 Literature Review and Contribution
The optimistic view about democracy holds that free elections should allow voters
to vote corrupt politicians out of office. This threat to their reelection prospects
should in turn prevent office-motivated politicians from engaging in corrupt activ-
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ities. The implication is that democracies should be more immune to corruption
than nondemocratic countries. Summarizing a large stream of the literature,
Stephenson (2015) concludes that there is little evidence supporting this claim.
Within democracies, by and large, corrupt politicians are typically reelected,
even after being convicted for wrongdoings.
This raises the question of how and in which circumstances democratic insti-
tutions may empower citizens and enable them to better control politicians. At
least two conditions have been identified as essential: (i) the details of electoral
institutions create more or less incentives for politicians to engage in corruption
and make it more or less costly for voters to vote against corrupt candidates,
and (ii) to exercise the formal power given by democratic institutions, voters
also require relevant information about politicians’ wrongdoings. Below, we re-
view the literature and explain how our paper contributes to each of these two
dimensions.
The role of electoral institutions. As noted by Rose-Ackerman (2005),
electoral institutions differ in the opportunities they provide for legislators to
engage in corrupt activities, as well as in the incentives and abilities for voters and
opposition to monitor, unveil, and punish corrupt activities by incumbents. For
example, comparing majoritarian and PR systems, Persson and Tabellini (2000)
argue that voting over individual candidates (as in a majoritarian system) rather
than over lists (as in a closed-list PR system) creates a direct link between a
politician’s performance and re-election. This, in turn, gives politicians incentives
to avoid corruption (Persson, Tabellini, and Trebbi (2003)). Since open-list PR
shares with plurality this feature of having voters vote directly on candidates,
open-list PR should be superior to closed-list PR.5
There are nevertheless a number of potential countervailing effects (Stephenson
(2015)).6 While voters have more power in open-list systems, party discipline is
5 As summarized in Rose-Ackerman (2005) “plurality rule voting ought to do a bet-
ter job at controlling corrupt political rent-seeking than PR, especially closed-list
PR. (...) Because open-list PR systems share features of both closed-list PR and
plurality systems, they occupy an ‘intermediate’ category in monitoring corrupt
self-enrichment.” (p. 54)
6 These countervailing effects may explain why empirical studies that compare open-
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presumably stronger in closed-list systems, where candidates totally rely on par-
ties to get elected. If parties are more effective than voters in disciplining politi-
cians, one may expect more corruption in open-list systems. Furthermore, by
inducing fiercer intraparty competition, open-list systems may induce politicians
to engage in more unlawful activities to attract votes (instrumental corruption).7
In this paper, we unveil a new countervailing effect. We start by noting that
the standard argument about giving voters more control in the open-list systems
focuses exclusively on voters’ choice within parties. We show that explicitly
modeling vote choice between parties yields a rather different picture. A recent
paper by Blumenau et al. (2017) argues that a move from closed- to open-list
system is likely to be more favorable to parties with more internal disagreement
on key issues.8 We propose a simple decision-theoretic model of voter behavior
that explores similar arguments in the case of corruption. We show that in
theory opening the lists is likely to benefit the most corrupt parties and that this
prediction is supported by our experimental findings in the Paraguayan context.
Note that compared with the previous literature on countervailing effects that
centers on parties and candidates strategies, our controlled experiment setting
allows us to abstract from this list-level endogeneity, and to compare the in-
centives for voters to vote for the different lists holding all other things equal,
especially the quality of the candidates. In doing so, we avoid the confounding
effects that may affect existing empirical studies comparing open- and closed-list
PR and are likely to be the reason these reach inconsistent conclusions.
The role of information. As reviewed above, the main argument in favor
and closed-list PR reach inconsistent conclusions. Some find that closed-list PR
systems are associated with higher perceived corruption than open-list systems
(Chang and Golden (2007); Persson et al. (2003); Tavits (2007); Kselman (2011);
Nyblade and Reed (2008)), while others find that they have lower perceived cor-
ruption (Brown, Touchton, and Whitford (2011); Potter and Tavits (2012)), and
many studies fail to find evidence of a significant difference (Kunicova and Rose-
Ackerman (2005); Serra (2006); Schleiter and Voznaya (2014)).
7 Chang (2005) provides evidence of such an effect in post-World War II Italy.
8 They provide experimental evidence supporting this claim by conducting a survey
experiment in the context of a hypothetical EU election in the UK. They show
that using an open-list ballot shifts support from the UKIP Party (a niche party
defending Eurosceptic views) to the Eurosceptic candidates of the Conservative
Party (which is internally divided on the European integration issue).
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of democratic institutions as an effective tool to fight corruption is that voters
are hurt by corruption and are ready to punish politicians. In contexts in which
electoral institutions allow voters to individually punish corrupt politicians, the
lack of information may be the main obstacle preventing voters from exerting
control.
A number of papers have indeed shown that voters’ information and a high
salience of the corruption issue are key in generating punishment by voters.
Chang, Golden, and Hill (2010) study the legislatures that sat in Italy’s lower
house between 1948 and 1994, elected with an open-list system. They show that
corrupt politicians were only punished by voters after the heavy media coverage
of political corruption accompanying the Clean Hands operation in the early
1990s. Ferraz and Finan (2008) and Melo, Pereira, and Figueiredo (2009) find
large negative effects on the probability of reelection in Brazil when examining
the effect of audits reporting corruption.
Recently, a few field experiments have provided conflicting results about the
role of information. Banerjee, Kumar, Pande, and Su (2011) find that providing
Indian voters with information induces higher turnout and higher vote shares
for more qualified candidates. Chong, De La O, Karlan, and Wantchekon (2014)
provide experimental evidence during local elections in Mexico that information
decreases incumbent party support but also decreases voter turnout and support
for a challenger party. Arias, Larreguy, Marshall, and Querubin (2018) argue that
whether voters punish politicians when learning new information on wrongdoings
depends on their prior beliefs and how they are updated.
The Metaketa Initiative of the Evidence in Governance and Politics (EGAP)
network builds on the previous literature by performing a pre-registered meta-
analysis of seven randomized controlled trials conducted in six countries by in-
dependent research teams (Dunning et al. (2019)). It concludes to the absence
of overall evidence that information campaigns influence voter behavior.
While all these papers use measures of turnout and vote shares at the precinct
level as dependent variables, we study how voters react to information about cor-
ruption at the individual level. The fact that we have individual vote outcomes
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allows us to improve on previous studies by analyzing heterogeneity along a
number of dimensions, including political preferences such as party attachment,
education and income.9 We find very little evidence in the Paraguayan context
that voters dislike corrupt politicians and vote against them when given the op-
portunity. If anything, under the open-list system, supporters of the incumbent
party tend to cast more votes in favor of candidates who were involved in a recent
corruption scandal. At least in our context, information does not seem to be the
most important barrier preventing voters from voting against corrupt politicians.
3 A Theoretical Comparison of Closed-list and
Open-list Proportional Representation
We propose a simple model to explicitly compare which parties voters choose to
vote for under closed- and open-list PR systems.10
3.1 Assumptions
Most of the existing literature emphasizing the potential adversarial effects of
opening the lists has focused on the differences in incentives parties and candi-
dates face under the two systems. Our model unveils another negative effect,
which stems solely from voter behavior. To analyze this new channel separately,
we hold the characteristics and strategies of the parties and of the candidates
fixed under both systems.11
Assume that a voter faces a choice between L parties, each presenting a list of
K candidates. We assume that voters derive some intrinsic ‘consumption utility’
from supporting a party and/or candidates they like and voting against candi-
9 This is crucial in the Paraguayan setting (and in many Latin American countries;
see, for example, Gonzalez Ocantos, de Jonge, and Nickerson (2014)), where vote
buying, distrust and lack of information about the democratic system are likely
to vary considerably across different demographic groups.
10 See Appendix A for a discussion and extensions.
11 Note that this is also consistent with our experimental strategy, since in our voting
experiment respondents vote under both systems for the same set of candidates
and with the same information.
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dates they dislike. We further assume that this expressive utility is independent
of other voters’ decisions. Since we assume away any strategic interactions across
voters, in the rest of this subsection, we consider one individual voter in isolation.
Formally, we make the following assumptions:
Assumption 1 [Abstention]: Whatever the system, we normalize to 0
the utility the voter obtains if she abstains.
Assumption 2 [Subjective ratings of parties]: The voter attaches a
subjective value to each of the L parties. This value is independent of the specific
candidates running on the party list. It reflects the general congruence between
the party and the voter, her personal history or any links she may have with this
party. Denote by ul the value attached to party l by the voter. We assume that
ul can take any real value, positive or negative, and that for any given party, it is
the same under both systems. A positive (negative) rating means that the voter
likes (dislikes) this party.
Assumption 3 [Subjective ratings of candidates]: The voter at-
taches subjective values to each of the L ∗ K candidates running on the lists.
For l = 1, ..., L and c = 1, ..., K, we denote by qlc the “subjective value” attached
to candidate c on list l. We assume that qlc can take any real value, positive or
negative, and that for any given candidate it is the same under both systems. A
positive (negative) rating means that the voter likes (dislikes) this candidate.
Under the closed-list system, when the voter votes for a list, she has no way
of distinguishing among candidates on this list. In a way, she must “passively”
vote for all the candidates on this list. We capture this feature by the following
assumption:
Assumption 4 [Closed-list]: Under the closed-list system, the expressive
utility the voter derives from voting for list l is given by the following:
U lclosed = u
l +
( ∑
c=1,...,K
qlc
)
. (1)
The first component is her general utility for the party (ul). The second compo-
nent is the total (subjective) evaluation of the candidates on the list. The fact
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that the voter must passively vote for all the candidates on the list is captured
by the equal weight put on all candidates’ ratings. Note that the voter suffers a
utility loss if some candidates on the list have a negative rating.
We consider an open-list system where, when the voter votes for a list, she
must also make a decision regarding each single candidate on this list, i.e.,
whether she wants to “actively” vote for this candidate or not. Since the de-
cision for each single candidate is binary (vote for this candidate or not), in the
sequel, we will also say that a voter votes “against” a candidate if she does not
vote for him. The ability to discriminate among candidates under an open-list
system is captured by the following assumption:
Assumption 5 [Open-list]: Under an open-list system, the expressive util-
ity the voter derives from voting for party list l and for a subset of candidates C
on this list is given by the following:
U l,Copen = u
l +
(1 + Ψ+) ∗
 ∑
c=1,...,K:
c∈C
qlc

+
(1−Ψ−) ∗
 ∑
c=1,...,K:
c/∈C
qlc

 , (2)
where 0 ≤ Ψ− ≤ 1, and 0 ≤ Ψ+.
The first component is again her general utility for the party (ul). The second
component is the sum of the ratings of the candidates she actively votes for on the
list, weighted by some parameter (1 + Ψ+), with 1 + Ψ+ ≥ 1. This captures the
idea that the (positive or negative) utility derived from actively voting in favor
of a candidate is larger in absolute value than the utility derived from passively
voting for the same candidate in the closed-list system (remember that in the
closed-list system, the weight on the subjective rating of each candidate is 1).
The third component is the sum of the ratings of the candidates she votes against,
weighted by another parameter (1 − Ψ−), which is assumed to be positive but
smaller than 1. The (positive or negative) utility derived from actively voting
against a candidate is smaller in absolute value than the utility derived from
passively voting for the same candidate in the closed-list system. Parameters Ψ+
and Ψ− can be interpreted as psychological parameters describing respectively
how much the voter values being able to actively vote for, and against, individual
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candidates under the open-list system.
Assumption 6 [Voter choice]: Under each system, the voter identifies
the list—and under the open-list system the subset of candidates within this
list—yielding the highest utility. If this maximal utility is negative, she abstains;
otherwise, she votes for this list (and under the open-list system this subset of
candidates within the list).
Note that the subjective ratings of parties and candidates introduced in As-
sumptions 2 and 3 are voter-specific; they measure the congruence between the
party/candidate and the voter. It is important to note that at this stage, we
make no specific assumptions regarding how these subjective ratings relate to
objective characteristics of the parties and candidates, such as their level of cor-
ruption. In the standard argument in favor of open-list systems, the implicit
assumption is that they correlate negatively with the candidates’ level of cor-
ruption. In our model, we remain very general and allow for any kind of voter
preferences.12
This very simple model captures the main differences, from the voter per-
spective, between a closed- and an open-list system. It makes some nontrivial
and novel predictions about the comparison between these two systems.
3.2 Predictions
To draw this comparison between the two systems, we first derive the optimal
vote choices implied by Assumption 6 under each system.
Closed-list system In the closed-list system, the choice is quite straightfor-
ward since it only entails comparing the utilities for parties defined in (1) and
the utility for abstention (normalized to 0 according to Assumption 1).
Open-list system In the open-list system, the voter chooses to vote or
abstain, but if voting for a party, she also chooses a subset of candidates from
this party. It is straightforward from (2) that conditional on voting for party l,
12 These subjective measures are impacted by the quality of voters’ information. In
Appendix A, we propose a formal derivation of these subjective evaluations, where
we explicitly model the role of uncertainty and imperfect information.
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the voter should vote for all the candidates with a strictly positive evaluation
(qlc > 0) and should vote against/not vote for any candidate with a strictly
negative evaluation (qlc < 0). Regarding the candidates such that q
l
c = 0, she is
indifferent between voting for them or not. Denote by U l ∗open the utility resulting
from this optimal choice of candidates within list l.
This simple remark illustrates that, within lists, opening the lists benefits
candidates who receive a positive evaluation from a large number of voters and
hurts candidates who receive a negative evaluation from a large number of voters.
In particular, if voters’ ratings of candidates are negatively correlated with the
candidates’ level of corruption, this remark captures the standard argument in
favor of open-lists, namely, that they give voters the opportunity to vote against
“bad” corrupt politicians.
For each list, we can now explicitly write the difference between the maximum
utility under open-list (U l ∗open) and the utility a voter derives from voting for this
same list under the closed-list system (U lclosed):
U l ∗open − U lclosed =
Ψ+ ∗ ∑
c=1,...,K:
qlc>0
qlc
+
Ψ− ∗ ∑
c=1,...,K:
qlc<0
∣∣qlc∣∣
 . (3)
Equation (3) first shows that whatever the list, the utility derived by the
voter from voting for a list is at least as high in the open-list system as in the
closed-list one. This result is quite intuitive. Indeed, in the open-list system,
there is an increased weight in her utility of the value of the candidates the voter
likes (and thus votes for) (qlc > 0) and a reduced weight of the value of the
candidates she does not like (and thus votes against) (qlc < 0).
Since, in both systems, the value of abstention is normalized to 0 (Assumption
1) and a voter votes if and only if at least one list yields a positive utility (As-
sumption 6), our first proposition is that abstention should be (at least weakly)
lower in the open-list system than in the closed-list system.
Proposition 1 (Effect of open-lists on abstention): Opening the lists
decreases abstention.
12
Second, equation (3) also shows that this increase in utility is likely to be
heterogeneous across party lists. The difference is larger when the list has many
candidates the voter likes (the
∑
c=1,...,K: qlc>0
qlc term) but also interestingly when
the list has many candidates the voter dislikes (the
∑
c=1,...,K:qlc<0
∣∣qlc∣∣ term). This
leads to Proposition 2:
Proposition 2 (Between-list effects): Opening the lists benefits lists with
candidates over which voters have strong preferences, either positive or negative.
The finding about candidates with bad ratings is particularly interesting. If
a voter likes a party but strongly dislikes some candidates on its list, under the
closed-list system, this voter might choose to abstain or vote for another party.
When the lists are opened, the voter can now cross out politicians she does not
like, which might induce her to cast a vote in favor of this initial list.
Proposition 2 has an interesting corollary in terms of information. Indeed,
note that the level of information the voter has about the candidates on the
lists is likely to affect the strength of voter preferences (i.e., the magnitude of
the
∣∣qlc∣∣). When a candidate is highly present in the media or is well known
to the voter because he/she has been in office for a long time, he/she is likely
to generate strong views and feelings, either positive or negative. Proposition
2 therefore implies that opening the lists is likely to benefit parties with well-
known candidates, over which voters have strong feelings, independently of their
‘true’ quality and of whether voters like them or not. Which parties are these in
practice? In many contexts, these are likely to be the large, incumbent parties.
Indeed, incumbent parties generally have more visible, better-known candidates.
Candidates from the parties in power enjoy more exposure in the media, either
because they have been more active when in power or because they benefit from
more campaign funds and relevant resources from their party. In weak democratic
contexts, the incumbent parties are often associated with the highest levels of
perceived corruption. In these contexts, Proposition 2 implies that the most
corrupt parties are the ones likely to benefit from these between-list effects of
opening the lists.
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Another interesting implication of equation (3) is that the effects of opening
the lists are likely to be heterogeneous across voter groups, depending on their
general political information. Indeed, the level of information a voter has about
the candidates on the lists is likely to affect the strength of her preferences (i.e.,
the magnitude of the
∣∣qlc∣∣). A voter with poor information about the candidates
running on the different lists is likely to have subjective evaluations of the can-
didates close to 0. In contrast, a sophisticated voter who has a good general
knowledge about the qualities and the characteristics of the candidates is likely
to have stronger feelings (either good or bad) about the various candidates run-
ning on the list. Only in that case will he/she be able to exploit the additional
opportunities offered by the open-list systems to express his/her preferences for
individual candidates.13 This result is stated in Proposition 3:
Proposition 3 (Heterogeneous effects): The consequences of opening the
lists described in Propositions 1 and 2 are expected to be stronger (in magnitude)
for voters who are well-informed about politics in general and who are politically
more sophisticated.
Proposition 3 points to a potential political inequality in how citizens use the
opportunities offered by open-list systems. In the Paraguayan context, these po-
litically well-informed, sophisticated voters will be overrepresented in the sample
of respondents from the Capital city Asuncio´n, compared to our rural sample.
4 The Paraguayan Context
4.1 The General Political Setting
Paraguay emerged from the longest-standing right-wing dictatorship in Latin
America in 1989 (See Straub (2014)) for an overview of the recent political history
of Paraguay). It is a country with weak institutions, a very corrupt political class
with large-scale clientelism and widespread vote-buying at election time (Finan
and Schechter (2012)). Public firms are the target of intense rent-seeking, for
13 We formalize the predictions about the quality of information in Appendix C.
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example in the case of the large dam Itaipu´ (See Straub (2015)). Paraguay has
ranked consistently among the most corrupt countries in Latin America.14
On a national level, Paraguay elects a head of state–the president–and a legis-
lature. The president is elected for a five-year term. The National Congress (Con-
greso Nacional) has two chambers: the Chamber of Deputies (Ca´mara de Diputa-
dos) has 80 members, and the Chamber of Senators (Ca´mara de Senadores) has
45 members. All members of the Senate, which is the focus of the experimental
part of this paper, are elected for a five-year term by closed party-list propor-
tional representation with universal suffrage, in a national circumscription.
Interestingly, in recent years, there has been a discussion about opening the
lists, particularly as a way to address corruption. Closed-lists are referred to
locally as “listas sa´banas” (“blanket lists”) and are widely considered to favor
corrupt candidates.15
Paraguay has long been characterized by a strong two-party system. The
main party is Associacio´n Nacional Republicana (ANR), locally known as the
Colorado (red) Party. It has been in power since 1947, including the 35 years
of the dictatorship of Alfredo Stroessner, with only one interruption during the
2008-2013 period. The other historical party is the Partido Liberal Radical
Aute´ntico (PLRA), known as the Liberal (blue) Party. It has been the main
opposition party for most of the period when the Colorado were in power. In
the 2013 election, the Colorado and Liberal Parties together captured 71% of the
seats in the Senate and 89% in the Chamber of deputies.
Apart from these two main parties, the two other parties that won Senate
seats in the 2013 election were the Frente Guasu´ (Concentracio´n Nacional Frente
Guasu´ - FG), led by former president Lugo, and Partido Democra´tico Progresista
14 In 2016, Paraguay ranked 123 out of 176 countries in the Transparency Interna-
tional Corruption Index, and from 1998 to 2006, it ranked in the lowest 10 percent
on Control of Corruption Indicators (WBGI).
15 See, for example, a compilation of news articles on the topic
in the newspaper ABC: http://www.abc.com.py/tag/listas-sabana-
9228.html, and the site of an association fighting for opening of lists:
https://asofueralistasabana.blogia.com/2014/101105-la-lucha-por-el-desbloqueo-
de-listas-en-el-paraguay.php.
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(PDP), with 5 and 3 seats, respectively. These two smaller parties both run on
more progressive, anticorruption platforms.
Political life is generally characterized by a low degree of public involvement,
with little knowledge of and volatile trust in political institutions. Interestingly,
the results from opinion polls and from our own survey (See Tables C1 and C2
in Appendix C) show that the two main parties are perceived as equally corrupt.
Nevertheless, voters’ identification with their party of choice is quite strong, often
across many family generations (Table C3).
4.2 The Bogado Scandal: “The Golden Nanny”
Our experimental design uses a corruption scandal involving the Congress that
was elected in April 2013. Following the publication of information on pub-
lic institutions’ payrolls in November 2013, a number of high-profile corruption
scandals involving members of Congress erupted. Senators who had abused the
public servant law to obtain numerous remunerations for their family and friends
were exposed. However, the Senate refused to lift parliamentary immunity to al-
low for the judicial investigation of one of its members, Victor Bogado (from the
Colorado party), by a narrow margin (23 Senators out of 45 voted against lifting
Bogado’s immunity).16 Known as “nin˜era de oro” (“Golden Nanny”), the case
involved Bogado’s “nanny”, who had two simultaneous very well-paid full-time
jobs, in Congress and in the State company Itaipu´. Contrasting with the usual
apathy of Paraguayan citizens, these facts spurred a strong public outburst of
indignation, both in social networks and in the street. A striking and unprece-
dented reaction was that numerous shops in capital city Asuncio´n posted signs
saying that the 23 senators who voted against lifting immunity were not welcome
there. This eventually led the Senate to revert its decision.
A noteworthy feature is that this scandal involved in quite similar terms the
two main political parties, the governing Colorado Party (ANR) and the main
opposition Liberal Party (PLRA), as senators from both of them voted to protect
16 See Figures B4 and B5 for lists of all Senate members and of those who voted to
protect Bogado, respectively.
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their colleague (excluding Bogado himself, 13 were from the Colorado party17 and
9 from the Liberal party). In that sense, the impact is unlikely to be the simple
expression of one-sided political preferences.18
5 Experimental Design and Data Collection
Our survey was run during the spring of 2015, that is, two years after the elections
that took the Colorado Party back to power and one year after the Bogado
scandal (See Figure 1). Our survey consisted of three components: (i) a first
set of questions on the household socioeconomic characteristics, (ii) a voting
experiment, and (iii) a set of questions about political attitudes.
5.1 Description of the Voting Experiment
The voting experiment consisted of the following.19
The “scandal reminder” treatment. Before the hypothetical elections
took place, we presented all respondents with a 3-page-long news booklet. In
a between-subject design, the first two pages were common for all participants:
the first page was about a young Paraguayan player being recruited by the top
European soccer team FC Barcelona, and the second one was about ‘7 Cajas’,
a Paraguayan movie, which obtained international recognition. Information was
randomized on the third page. The control group was presented with the pic-
tures and names of all the Senators elected in the 2013 election. We had two
treatments containing different reminders about the corruption scandal involving
Senator Bogado. Treatment 1–Treatment Corruption–was a simple reminder of
the fact that 23 senators voted against removing impunity and hence tried to
stop the judicial trial against Bogado. The names, pictures, and parties of these
senators were given. Treatment 2–Treatment Corruption Social–highlighted, to-
gether with the pictures of the 23 senators, the social punishment this scandal
17 From them, two later left the party and were listed as independent at the time of
our experiment.
18 Bogado was reelected in the 2018 Senate election. He was finally sentenced to a
one year suspended jail term in May 2019 and soon after ousted from the Senate.
19 All experimental materials and protocol text are presented in Appendix B.
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generated, in the form of these senators not being allowed into some public places
or businesses.
The two hypothetical elections. Each respondent was asked to take
part in two successive hypothetical votes to elect their senators (within-subject
design).20 The experimental ballots were based on the lists of candidates who
actually ran in the 2013 election. In the 2013 Senate election, there were 22
lists of 45 names each. To avoid having ballot forms that were too long, we
restricted the choice set to the four main lists (Colorado (ANR), Liberal (PLRA),
Frente Guasu´ (FG), Partido Democra´tico Progresista (PDP)) and to the 20 first
candidates in each list. All the candidates actually elected in 2013 were on our
experimental lists. Respondents first voted with the closed-list system and then
with the open-list system. 21 In the closed-list election, voters could choose one
of the lists or abstain. In the open-list election, they could similarly choose one of
the lists (or abstain) and had the added option of crossing out one or more names
on that list. There was no limit on the number of names they could cross out.
To respect the secrecy of the votes, respondents were invited to move away from
the interviewer while they were filling in the ballots. Once they had completed
the two ballots, they put them inside sealed envelopes and handed them back to
the interviewer.
Description of the candidates included in the voting experiment.
We provide in Table C4 the descriptive statistics on the 20 candidates included
in the experiment for the main two parties (Colorado and Liberal). Candidates
have been in the Senate for 8 years on average. As per gender, 15 percent of the
incumbent party candidates are women, as opposed to 31 percent for the Liberal
Party.
20 See the details of the protocol in Appendix B.
21 Closed-lists was the voting system presented first to the individuals, given that it
is the current system in Paraguay and hence is well known to the participants.
Even if raising usual ordering effect concerns, we believe that this order helped a
population not familiar with abstract thinking to ground the voting idea for the
posterior explanation of the open-list system, and it also reflected the potential
real-world transition. Given the potential anchoring effect generated by the closed-
list vote, this means that our results are likely to be lower bounds on the actual
effects.
18
In addition, we collected information on the candidates’ public exposure and
proxies for corruption: whether they are present on Facebook and Twitter, the
number of mentions of their name in the main local newspaper (ABC Color),
and regarding corruption exposure in the media, the number of mentions of
their name with the word ‘corruption’, in the same main local newspaper (ABC
Color).22
In most of our subsequent analyses, we will use as a proxy for a candidate’s
level of corruption a dummy indicating whether he or she was involved in the
Bogado scandal. We use the media measure of corruption to validate this ex-
perimental proxy. In the sample of 40 candidates, the correlation between the
standardized z-score of media corruption mention and a dummy variable indi-
cating whether a candidate is exposed in the experiment as part of the 23 who
voted to protect Bogado is 0.31, with a p-value of 0.052. Table C5 shows t-
tests across the main characteristics for involved vs. non-involved candidates.
Involved candidates appear to be mostly males, more experienced, ranked higher
on the list, more often tied to corruption in the media, and more present on
social media. The last four characteristics are individually significant, and all
are jointly significant.
5.2 Implementation and Experimental Sample
A pilot was conducted by the authors and the team of enumerators in March
2015. The final survey was implemented between April and June 2015 in two
areas of Paraguay: the capital Asuncio´n and the rural area of Caaguazu´ (See
Figure 2).
In each area, we selected neighborhoods and streets, and enumerators walked
in every other house. Randomization of the information treatment was done
at the household level. Whenever willing, the present adult household member
was interviewed. Whenever the spouse of the main respondent was present and
accepted to take part in the survey, we also interviewed him or her, with an
22 We use a count of these mentions between June 30, 2013, which is the date the
new legislature took office, and March 30, 2015, the end of the month immediately
before our experimental rollout.
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additional randomization of the treatment within couples.23
The final database includes 1,547 individuals in Asuncio´n and 1,094 in
Caaguazu´. Table C6 shows that our sample is well balanced across treatments.
Table C7 presents the comparison of our sample with the 2015 National House-
hold surveys, for the two regions separately, showing that the subsamples are
quite representative at the regional level. Table C8 shows that respondents in
the rural area of Caaguazu´ are significantly poorer, less educated, and more likely
to speak mostly Guaran´ı, the local indigenous language, than those in Asuncio´n.
6 Results
6.1 Between-List Vote Decisions
Proposition 2 states that opening the lists should benefit the lists of incumbent
parties with candidates over which voters have strong preferences while hurting
small parties and reducing abstention (Proposition 1).
In Figure 3, we present the percentage of respondents voting for the Colorado
Party (ANR), voting for the Liberal Party (PLRA), voting for the two smaller
parties (FG and PDP) grouped together, and abstaining under each system.
The top graph presents the results for the control group, the middle graph for
first information treatment, and the bottom graph for the second information
treatment.
As predicted by Proposition 2, regardless of the information treatment, the
Colorado incumbent obtains significantly more votes under the open-list system
than in the closed-list system, while the smallest parties FG and PDP get fewer
votes. These effects are very large: between 6 and 9 percentage points (depend-
ing on the treatment) for the Colorado Party and between 6 and 8 percentage
points for the small parties. Consistent with the Liberal Party’s candidates being
intermediate between those of the Colorado and those of the smallest parties in
terms of internal heterogeneity and public exposure, the effects on votes for the
23 Overall, we have 446 households (18%) for which the survey answers and voting
results of both members are available.
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Liberal Party are smaller in size and inconsistent in sign across treatments. Our
data also bring some support for Proposition 1: regardless of the information
treatment, fewer respondents abstain in the open-list system, but the effect is
significant only in the control group.
Clearly, open-lists favor the incumbent party by triggering a transfer of votes
from the smallest parties and from previously abstaining voters. To better un-
derstand these changes, Figure 4 shows the flows of voters between options across
the two electoral systems for the control group. We see that a substantial fraction
of voters (22%) make different choices across systems. From them, the largest
move comes from voters that abstain or vote for small parties in the closed-list
system and vote for the larger parties when lists are opened (10%): only 55%
of voters that abstain or vote for small parties in the closed-list system remain
faithful to their option in the open-list system.24
To analyze in more detail how vote decisions between lists vary with the elec-
toral system and the provision of information, we estimate a general specification
of the following form:
yis = α + βSystem
Open + (SystemOpen ∗ T ji )′γ + θi + uis (4)
where yis denotes individual i vote decision under system s = {closed; open},
i.e., the individual choice about the party for which to vote (the two smaller
parties FG and PDP are grouped together) or whether to abstain.25 SystemOpen
is a dummy variable that takes the value one for the choices under the open-list
system, and T ji is a vector of dummy variables for the different informational
treatments j = {1, 2} (with T 1 being the Treatment Corruption and T 2 being
the Treatment Corruption Social). All specifications include voter-fixed effects
24 This is a remarkable result, as despite a well-documented anchoring effect that
may run counter finding any results, in our setting over a fifth of all voters, and
over half of those who voted for small parties in the traditional closed-list system,
change their behavior when presented with the open-list system.
25 Abstention decisions are treated as an option in its own right. Alternative speci-
fications in which abstention is treated as missing and the sample is restricted to
votes for one of the parties yield very similar results (Tables C9 and C10, Appendix
C).
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θi.
Panel A of Table 1 presents the results from estimating Equation (4). The
estimations confirm that in the control group, there is a significant positive effect
of the open-list system on participation and on votes for the incumbent (Colorado
Party) and to a lesser extent on the votes for the main challenger (Liberal Party).
The Colorado Party obtains an additional 6.5 pp. in votes (Column 1), a 13%
increase. On the other hand, small parties lose 6.6 pp. (Column 3), a 28%
decrease, and abstention decreases by 2.3 pp. (Column 4), a 18% decrease.
Interaction effects between the open-list system and the treatments reveal
how the effects above are affected by the provision of information on candidates
involved in the Bogado scandal. For the Colorado Party, there is an additional
vote-increasing effect of the two treatments, although it is not statistically sig-
nificant. For the Liberal Party, there is a vote-reducing effect of the Treatment
Corruption in the open system, that overcomes the positive effect of opening
the lists. For small parties, there is negative effect of the Treatment Corruption
Social, which roughly corresponds to the transfer of votes to the Colorado Party.
Proposition 3 states that the magnitude of these effects should be larger
among voters possessing a higher level of general political information. To ob-
tain a first evaluation of this prediction, we use the fact that respondents in the
urban area of Asuncio´n are significantly richer and more educated than those in
Caaguazu´ (See Table C8), characteristics that are known to correlate positively
with better political information. Panels B and C of Table 1 present the results
from estimating Equation (4) for the Asuncio´n and the Caaguazu´ samples sepa-
rately. Consistent with Proposition 3, the estimations show that in the control
group, the positive effect of the open-list system on votes for the incumbent
(Colorado Party) is larger in Asuncio´n (8.7 pp. in votes (Column 1, Panel B))
than Caaguazu´ (3.4 pp. in votes (Column 1, Panel C)). Interestingly, opening
the lists has a negative and significant impact on abstention in Asuncio´n (6.5 pp.
decrease (Column 4, Panel B)) but not in Caaguazu´ where the sign is reversed
(3.6 pp. increase (Column 4, Panel C)).
In Appendix C, Tables C11 to C13 provide further heterogeneous effects
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by interacting the system and the treatment variables with the following voters’
characteristics: age, main language spoken, and education. These results confirm
that the between-list effect favoring the incumbent Colorado Party is consistently
stronger among the more educated, and Spanish–rather than Guaran´ı–speakers.
The most striking results are those related to education and language, which show
almost no effect from opening the lists among the less educated and non-Spanish
speaking population. The counterintuitive results on abstention in Caaguazu´
discussed above also appear to be driven by this subset of the population. We
therefore find strong support for Proposition 3: only the subset of citizens with
better general political information are able to use the additional opportunities
offered by the open-list systems.
6.2 Within-List Vote Decisions
Our experimental data allow us to explore the validity of the main hypothesis the
literature has presented in support of open-list systems: that open electoral rules
allow voters to vote against corrupt politicians, especially so in high information
environments.
Voters in the open-list system do cross out candidates: on average, Colorado
voters cross out 3.77 candidates (std. 2.70) and Liberal voters 3.29 (std. 2.43)
candidates. For the smaller parties FG and PDP, the number crossed out are
2.75 and 3.43, respectively.
In Table 2, we describe how the number of cross-outs varies across voter
characteristics for voters who voted for the Colorado incumbent or its main chal-
lenger, the Liberal party, in the open-list system. Column 1 shows that the
Colorado voters cross out on average 0.5 more candidates than the liberal voters,
a significant difference at the 1% level. Column 2 interacts party choice with
the information treatment, finding no significant effect of the information pro-
vided. Columns 3 and 4 add individual characteristics. Voters in the Capital
Asuncio´n make one additional cross-out on average, while less educated voters
make fewer cross-outs, although the effect is only marginally significant. We find
no significant effect of interacting individual characteristics with the informa-
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tion treatments. These effects are in line with the heterogeneous effect on vote
changes when opening the lists presented in the previous section: urban and
more educated voters seem to be able to exploit better the opportunity offered
by the open-list system. Finally, Columns 5 and 6 show that individuals who
changed their choice when opening the lists (“switchers”) do make 0.7 cross-outs
more, on average, with this effect being slightly greater for individuals in the
social punishment information treatment.
Analysis at the candidate - voter level
Last, to explore in more detail whether voters punish corrupt candidates, we
move to a candidate-voter specification, which allows us to study the determi-
nants of voters’ subjective ratings of the candidates.26 In this analysis, we include
candidates’ characteristics (gender, years in office, rank on the party list, pres-
ence in the social media), as well as measures of corruption–a dummy indicating
whether the candidate was among the 23 senators related to the Bogado immu-
nity scandal (‘Involved’) and a measure of how the candidate name is related to
corruption in the press (’Media Score on Corruption’).
We run the following specification:
Crossij = α + β ∗ Involvedj + (Xj)′δ + θi + uij,
where Xj are candidates’ characteristics and θi are voter-fixed effects. We
focus on the two main parties and include all the candidates in the experimental
ballot. Panel A of Table 3 presents the results for the Colorado Party and Panel
B for the Liberal Party.
Column 1 of Table 3 shows that candidates that were involved in the Bogado
scandal get crossed out less when from the Colorado Party and more for the
Liberal Party while controlling for the candidate being elected (and hence able
to participate in the immunity vote). One possible explanation is that Colorado
voters do not consider it a bad thing for their senators to protect one of their
26 Figure C1 shows the share of voters crossing out each candidate, by treatment
status of the voters.
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own, while liberal voters clearly resent their elected senators to support immu-
nity for a member of the Colorado party. For the Colorado Party, the negative
coefficient on the immunity vote involvement is robust to the inclusion of the
additional controls. Column 2 shows that information treatment has no differ-
ential impact on this result.27 Columns 3 and 4 add candidates characteristics.
In Column 4, we include our second measure of corruption, media citation, and
we find a positive and significant effect. This points to mixed evidence regarding
voters’ reaction to corruption involvement since different measures attract differ-
ent signs. However, it should be noted that these two measures reflect different
acts: while the first is related to the immunity Senate vote and hence is not ex-
plicitly related to personal embezzlement, the second is related to how the media
has related the candidate’s name to corruption more generally. For the Liberal
Party, the positive sign on involvement in the Bogado scandal (Columns 1 and
2) becomes insignificant when candidate characteristics are included. The alter-
native measure of corruption, media citations, is also nonsignificant. Regarding
candidate characteristics, we see that for both parties, the candidates with more
experience and more social media exposure (as measured for having Facebook
and/or Twitter accounts) receive more cross-outs.
All results are conditional on controlling for whether a candidate was elected.
In column 5, we show they are unchanged when excluding this control. In par-
ticular, there is no shift towards non elected candidates as the result of the
information treatment. This indicates that voters’ behavior is not the result of
the actual 2013 election raising the information about and salience of elected
candidates.
In summary, we do not find strong support that voters use the opportunity
to cross corrupt candidates when lists are opened. If anything, there seems to be
a weak positive correlation between our measure of corruption (being involved
in protecting Bogado) and the number of votes for Colorado candidates. This
within-list analysis reveals that in this Paraguayan context, voters, especially
more educated voters, do use the additional opportunities offered by the open-list
27 This is also robust to including both voters- and candidates-fixed effects.
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system to express preferences over individual candidates. However, corruption
does not seem one of the most salient characteristics when choosing which can-
didates to cross. This is fully consistent with the evidence in Table C2: 82% of
respondents who voted for the Colorado Party in the 2013 presidential election
consider it to be quite or very corrupt. The equivalent number is 84% for the
Liberal Party, while it decreases to 46% and 25%, respectively, for the smaller
parties FG and the PDP.28
In addition, information treatments appear to have very little effect. This is
consistent with the fact that a very large fraction of treated voters declare they
were already aware of the Bogado scandal (Table B14), and the general belief
that all politicians are corrupt (Table B2).
7 Conclusion
The standard argument for opening lists in proportional systems is that it is
generally desirable to give voters more “control” by designing institutions allow-
ing them to select and punish individual politicians. When electoral institutions
formally give them this opportunity, the literature points to information as the
main obstacle to exercising this formal control.
In this paper, we propose a model that unveils a thus far neglected adversarial
effect of the opening of lists. It highlights that it is likely to favor incumbent
corrupt parties, by enhancing the value of their list regardless of the absolute
quality of the candidates themselves. Our experimental data largely support
this new prediction.
In addition, we question the usual assumption according to which voters
would punish corrupt candidates if given the opportunity to do so, by both a
28 The outcome of the 2018 election, run under the status quo closed-list system,
provides further evidence that corruption is not a salient characteristic of the
candidates whom voters are likely to punish. Together, the Colorado and the
Liberal Parties obtained 31 of the 45 Senate seats. Among the 23 Senators who
had been involved in the Bogado scandal, 16 were running for reelection, 10 for
the Colorado Party and 6 for the Liberal Party. Of these, 9 were reelected, 7
Colorados and 2 Liberals.
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more open electoral system and the provision of relevant information on politi-
cians’ behavior. If anything, for the incumbent party, candidates involved in
a recent highly publicized corruption scandal seem to receive more votes than
other candidates of the same party, and informational treatments have little to
no effect.
Combined with earlier work emphasizing other potential adversarial effects
of open-list systems, our results cast a negative light on these systems as a tool
against corruption.
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National	
election	
Senate	vote	
on	Bogado	
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experiment	
21	April	
2013	
14	Nov.	
2013	
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2015	
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2018	
Next	National	
Election	
Figure 1: Timing
The figure shows the timing of events. The national election of April 2013 was followed
by the Bogado scandal. The social movement following the Senate vote on Nov. 2013
are the events presented in our information treatment. Our experiment was performed
approximately one year after the end of the protests.
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Figure 2: Map of the experimental regions.
The map shows the two regions where the experiment was performed, the capital city
Asuncio´n (1547 participants) and the rural area of Caaguazu´ (1094 participants).
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Figure 3: Party votes under alternative electoral systems - By treatment groups.
The figure presents the percentages of respondents voting for the Colorado (ANR)
Party, the Liberal (PLRA) Party, and the small (FG and PDP) parties and abstaining
in the closed- and open-list system. The bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
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Table 1: Between-Parties Vote Decisions
Panel A: Whole Sample
Colorado Liberal Small parties Abstention
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Open system 0.0648*** 0.0250*** -0.0664*** -0.0234***
(0.011) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009)
Open*TC 0.0208 -0.0326*** -0.0085 0.0204
(0.018) (0.012) (0.016) (0.015)
Open*TCS 0.0146 0.0062 -0.0286* 0.0079
(0.018) (0.013) (0.016) (0.015)
Constant 0.4923*** 0.1411*** 0.2352*** 0.1314***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Observations 5,185 5,185 5,185 5,185
Number of voters 2,609 2,609 2,609 2,609
R-squared 0.038 0.008 0.050 0.003
Panel B: Asuncio´n
Colorado Liberal Small parties Abstention
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Open system 0.0867*** 0.0373*** -0.0587*** -0.0653***
(0.014) (0.009) (0.012) (0.011)
Open*TC 0.0028 -0.0505*** 0.0087 0.0390**
(0.025) (0.015) (0.021) (0.018)
Open*TCS 0.0144 -0.0001 -0.0424** 0.0281+
(0.025) (0.015) (0.021) (0.018)
Constant 0.5085*** 0.1167*** 0.2179*** 0.1568***
(0.007) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005)
Observations 3,031 3,031 3,031 3,031
Number of voters 1,525 1,525 1,525 1,525
R-squared 0.847 0.869 0.823 0.821
Panel C: Caaguazu´
Colorado Liberal Small parties Abstention
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Open system 0.0340** 0.0075 -0.0774*** 0.0358**
(0.015) (0.012) (0.015) (0.015)
Open*TC 0.0463* -0.0075 -0.0321 -0.0067
(0.026) (0.021) (0.026) (0.026)
Open*TCS 0.0149 0.0150 -0.0091 -0.0208
(0.027) (0.021) (0.026) (0.026)
Constant 0.4696*** 0.1754*** 0.2594*** 0.0955***
(0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Observations 2,154 2,154 2,154 2,154
Number of voters 1,084 1,084 1,084 1,084
R-squared 0.876 0.868 0.828 0.697
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1, + p<0.15. All specifications include voters-fixed effects. The variables TC
(Corruption) and TCS (Corruption Social) correspond to the treatments.
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Table 2: Within-list vote decisions: Number of cross-outs by voter
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Vote for Colorado 0.4758*** 0.5072** 0.3297** 0.3227** 0.5319*** 0.5341***
(0.155) (0.212) (0.126) (0.123) (0.168) (0.170)
TC -0.1022
(0.184)
TCS -0.0622
(0.106)
TC * Colorado 0.1925
(0.281)
TCS * Liberal 0.3253
(0.240)
Age over mean -0.1162 -0.2076
(0.135) (0.190)
Guarani speaker -0.1846 -0.2592
(0.189) (0.249)
Asuncion 1.1585*** 1.1103***
(0.159) (0.246)
Low education -0.3119+ -0.2328
(0.194) (0.198)
TC * Age 0.0456
(0.197)
TCS * Age 0.3012
(0.348)
TC * Guarani 0.1268
(0.336)
TCS * Guarani 0.1479
(0.355)
Info C * Asuncion 0.2346
(0.348)
TCS * Asuncion -0.0623
(0.273)
TC * Less educated -0.2371
(0.237)
TCS * Less educated -0.1187
(0.213)
Switcher 0.7613** 0.6484*
(0.311) (0.300)
TC * Switcher -0.0800
(0.442)
TCS * Switcher 0.5122+
(0.325)
Constant 3.2968*** 3.2578*** 3.0324*** 3.0529*** 3.0894*** 3.0958***
(0.285) (0.335) (0.274) (0.278) (0.248) (0.249)
Observations 1,880 1,880 1,880 1,880 1,880 1,880
R-squared 0.005 0.006 0.069 0.071 0.019 0.021
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, + p<0.15. The unit
of observation is a voter, and the dependent variable corresponds to the number of candidates the voter
crossed out. The sample is restricted to voters voting for the two main parties (Colorado and Liberal)
under open-lists. A switcher is defined as a voter who votes for different options in the different voting
systems presented.
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Table 3: Within-list vote decisions: Voter-candidate analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Colorado Party
Elected candidate 0.1561*** 0.1561*** -0.0683*** -0.0575***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008)
Involved in Bogado immunity vote -0.0806*** -0.0874*** -0.0492*** -0.0800*** -0.0866***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
TC * Involved 0.0133
(0.010)
TCS * Involved 0.0132
(0.010)
Gender (female) -0.0543*** 0.0250*** 0.0308***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Years in congress 0.0120*** 0.0119*** 0.0111***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Rank in party list -0.0009* -0.0049*** -0.0033***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Facebook 0.1174*** 0.0416*** 0.0420***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Twitter 0.2032*** 0.1032*** 0.0910***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Media score on corruption 0.0674*** 0.0679***
(0.002) (0.002)
Observations 31,060 31,060 31,060 31,060 31,060
R-squared 0.140 0.140 0.233 0.260 0.259
Panel B: Liberal Party
Elected candidate 0.0434*** 0.0434*** -0.0546** -0.0496*
(0.010) (0.010) (0.026) (0.027)
Involved in Bogado immunity vote 0.1152*** 0.1066*** 0.0203* 0.0190 0.0195
(0.011) (0.015) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
TC * Involved 0.0098
(0.023)
TCS * Involved 0.0279
(0.024)
Gender (female) -0.0333*** -0.0309*** -0.0296***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Years in congress 0.0052*** 0.0054*** 0.0064***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Rank in party list -0.0087*** -0.0085*** -0.0090***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Facebook 0.0652** 0.0575* -0.106
(0.033) (0.034) (0.015)
Twitter 0.0156* 0.0173** 0.0246***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Media score on corruption 0.0051 0.0112
(0.009) (0.009)
Observations 8,800 8,800 8,800 8,800 8,800
R-squared 0.143 0.144 0.178 0.178 0.177
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, + p<0.15. The unit of
observation is a voter-candidate relationship. The dependent variable is a dummy that takes value one if
the voter crossed the candidate out in the open-list vote. The variable ‘Media score on corruption’ is the
z-score of the variable ABC (Name+Corruption), which refers to the number of times the candidate was
mentioned in topics of corruption in the website of the newspaper ABC.
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Appendix A - Theoretical Framework: Discus-
sion and Extensions
In this appendix, we discuss general features of open-list systems and propose a
formal derivation of the updating of voters’ subjective evaluations of the candi-
dates to disentangle more clearly the role played by the a priori heterogeneity of
the lists and the general information about the candidates.
Voting systems: The main formal difference between closed- and open-list PR
systems lies in how much power voters are given to decide who gets elected within
a list. In a closed-list system, voters face party lists, each presenting a set of pre-
ordered candidates. The ranking of the candidates on the list is determined by
the party. Each voter votes for one of these party lists or abstains. Vote shares
determine how many seats each party gets. Within each list, the rank of the
candidates determines whether they are elected or not. In such a system, voters
have no direct control over which candidates within the lists are elected. The
only thing voters control is how many candidates get elected within each list.
In open-list systems, each voter votes for one party or abstains, and vote
shares determine how many seats each party gets, as in the closed-list system.
But voters can also (to some extent) determine which candidates within the list
are elected by additionally casting votes for individual candidates. There is a
wide variety of open-list systems in practice, which differ in the rules determining
how these votes for individual candidates can be cast. In particular, there are
some variations in the maximal number of candidate votes a voter is allowed to
cast: one (e.g., Sweden and Denmark), some fixed number larger than one (e.g.,
post-WWII Italy, where the maximum number of votes was three or four), or
even no limit (e.g., Latvia). Open-list systems also differ in how much votes over
candidates can overrule any pre-ordering of the candidates fixed by the parties.
In our survey, respondents are asked to vote under a closed-list system, and
under an open-list system in which they can vote for any number of candidates
on the list without any constraint. We will therefore study this case in the theory
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section.
Assumptions about voters’ information: Consider list l. Denote by xlc
the “true” value of candidate c for the voter. It is the value she would assign to
this candidate, were she is perfectly informed. In a situation where she is only
imperfectly informed about the characteristics and the history of the candidates,
we assume that the voter will form some expectations about the value of these
candidates based on two types of information: (i) the party a candidate belongs
to and (ii) some candidate-specific information she might have gathered in the
past.
Let us start with the former. We assume that the voter’s a priori beliefs on
the candidates’ values from list l follow i.i.d. normal distribution with mean 0
and standard deviation sl. The distribution of these a priori beliefs are the same
for all candidates in the party. It summarizes the general information the voter
has about this party. We will interpret sl as the a priori heterogeneity in the
party. For example, a large party that is well known to encompass a large variety
of ideological views will have a large sl, whereas a party which mainly focuses
on one single issue will have a low sl.
Apart from this general information about the party, the voter also has the
opportunity to learn some specific information about the candidates on the list.
It might be obtained through the electoral campaign, because some candidates
have already served in the government or in past legislatures, or because they
have been exposed in the media for whatever reason (including some corrup-
tion scandals). We will capture this candidate-specific information by assuming
that the voter receives a signal ylc that is informative about the value to her of
candidate c. More specifically, we will assume that ylc = x
l
c + 
l
c, where 
l
c is
normally distributed with mean 0 and standard error σlc (the 
l
c are assumed to
be independently distributed across candidates). The smaller σlc is, the higher
the quality of this candidate-specific signal. Note that we allow for the infor-
mativeness of the signals to vary with the candidates. Indeed, within the same
list, some candidates might have served longer terms in the past or have received
more exposure in the media than others.
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Under these assumptions, given her general information about the party and
conditional on the candidate-specific signal ylc, the voter updates her beliefs about
the value of candidate c, and at the time of the vote, the expected rating is as
follows:
qlc =
(sl)2
(sl)2 + (σlc)
2
∗ ylc. (A1)
The updated value qlc is a convex combination of the prior (0) and the signal
(ylc). If σ
l
c → +∞ (no further information about the candidates), the updated
value coincides with the prior (0), and if σlc → 0 (perfect information about the
candidates), the updated value coincides with the signal, which itself coincides
with the candidate value (xlc).
Votes under closed-list and open-list systems: In the closed-list system,
if a voter votes for a list, she passively votes for all the candidates on the list.
In contrast, in the open-list system, the best choice is to actively vote only
for candidates with a positive (expected) ratings (qlc). The difference between
the maximal utility a voter can derive from voting for list l under the open-
list system and the utility she derives from voting for this same list under the
closed-list system is given by formula (3) in the main text. Substituting for the
expression of qlc given in (A1), one obtains the following:
U l ∗open − U lclosed =
∑
c
(
(sl)2
(sl)2 + (σlc)
2
∗ (Ψ+ ∗max[ylc, 0]−Ψ− ∗min[ylc, 0])) > 0.
(A2)
Expression (A2) confirms that whatever the true quality of the candidates and
whatever the signals, participation should be higher under the open-list system
than under the closed-list system.
Comparative statics: To derive some comparative statics with respect to
the a priory heterogeneity of the list (sl) and the precision of the signal of the
candidates’ quality (1/(σlc)
2), we compute the ex ante expectation of quantity
(A2). Note that at this ex ante stage, ylc = x
l
c + 
l
c is normally distributed with
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mean 0 and variance (sl)2 + (σlc)
2. Noting that
E[max(ylc, 0)] =
√
(sl)2 + (σlc)
2)√
2pi
= −E[min(ylc, 0)], (A3)
one obtains that, in expectation, the difference in utility of voting for a given list
under open- and closed-list systems, denoted ∆U , is
∆U =
Ψ− + Ψ+√
2pi
∗
∑
c
(sl)2√
(sl)2 + (σlc)
2
. (A4)
Computing the partial derivatives yields the following:
∂(∆U)
∂((sl)2)
=
Ψ− + Ψ+
2
√
2pi
∗
∑
c
(sl)2 + 2(σlc)
2
((sl)2 + (σlc)
2)3/2
> 0, (A5)
∂(∆U)
∂(σlc)
2
= −Ψ
− + Ψ+
2
√
2pi
∗
∑
c
(sl)2
((sl)2 + (σlc)
2)3/2
< 0, (A6)
∂2(∆U)
∂((sl)2)∂(σlc)
2
=
Ψ− + Ψ+
4
√
2pi
∗
∑
c
(sl)2 − 2(σlc)2
((sl)2 + (σlc)
2)5/2
. (A7)
we can now state the following claim:
Claim: In expectation, the difference in utility of voting for a given list
under open- and closed-list systems increases with a priori heterogeneity of the
list ((sl)2) and with the precision of the signals on the candidates (1/(σlc)
2).
This claim provides support for our main predictions. Indeed, the incumbent
party is characterized by a presumably large a priori diversity and good infor-
mation on candidates. It should be the list that benefits the most from opening
the lists. In contrast, the small parties are a priori less diverse, and voters have
poor information on their candidates. In relative terms, they should lose from
opening the lists (Proposition 2). Furthermore, the difference in utility of voting
for a given list under open- and closed-list systems is increasing with the voter’s
information about the candidates. The effects of opening the lists are expected
to be larger in magnitude among well-informed voters (Proposition 3).
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Appendix B - Experimental Materials
Voting was always done with the participant alone in the room, standing apart
from the interviewer, to allow for privacy. Here is the transcript of how the
systems were presented to the participants. This presentation was preceded by a
reminder of the academic nature of the activity, of the guarantee of confidential-
ity, and of the right of the participant not to answer a question and/or stop the
questionnaire. The interviewers had a Guaran´ı translation to ensure homogeneity
of the explanation provided across languages.
1. In the current system in Paraguay, the following holds:
(a) Each voter votes for the list of a political party. Each party obtains
a number of seats in the Senate proportional to the number of votes
obtained, and
(b) Given the number of seats of each party, the candidates to the Senate
enter in the order indicated by the party on the electoral list.
Please look with attention at the form I am showing you. In it, you can
see the four principal parties that participated in the Senate elections on
April 21, 2013.
Please vote, marking on the form your choice (one of the parties or absten-
tion). When you have made your choice, please fold the form and place it
in the envelope.
2. There has been a debate in Paraguay about the possibility of opening the
electoral lists. The idea is to reform the electoral system so that voters can
not only vote for a party but also express their opinion on the candidates
inside the party lists.
Imagine the voting system was as follows:
(a) Each voter votes for the list of a political party. Each party obtains
a number of seats in the Senate proportional to the number of votes
obtained, and
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(b) When the voter chooses a party list, he/she can also cross out one or
more names of candidates that he/she wants to take out of the list.
In this system, to cross out one or more candidates’ names does not change
anything for the party, which obtains the same number of seats in the Sen-
ate. The only thing the system does is to take the crossed-out candidates
down the list and take the ones that were not crossed-out up the list.
We now ask you to proceed to vote with this system. In the form I am
handing to you, you should first mark the party you want to vote for or for
abstention. Once you have marked the list you want to vote for, you can
cross out one or more candidates’ names inside this list.
When you have made your choice, please fold the form and place it in the
envelope.
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LAS LISTAS ESTÁN CERRADAS Y NO PUEDEN SER ALTERADAS O MODIFICADAS 
	
Lilian	G.	Samaniego	
Luis	A.	Castiglioni	
Arnoldo	Wiens	
Mirta	L.	Gusinky	
Julio	Cesar	Velazquez	
Oscar	Gonzalez	Daher	
Gustavo	J.	Alfonso	
Enrique	F.	Bacchetta		
Silvio	A.	Ovelar	
Julio	A.	Quiñonez	
Juan	Carlos	Galaverna	
Derlis	A.	Osorio	
Blanca	Ovelar	
Mario	Abdo	Benitez	
Oscar	R.	Salomon	
Juan	Dario	Monges	
Victor	A.	Bogado	
Nelson	D.	Aguinagalde	
Carlos	Nuñez	
Oscar	Campuzano	
	
Blas	A.	Llano	
Emilia	P.	Alfaro	
Ramon	Gomez	
Carlos	A.	Amarilla	
Zulma	R.	Gomez	
Enzo	Cardozo	
Julio	Cesar	Franco	
Luis	A.	Wagner	
Blanca	B.	Fonseca	
Miguel	Abdon	Saguier	
Fernando	A.	Silva	
Maria	Mignarro	
Roberto	R.	Acevedo	
Francisco	J.	Rivas	
Corina	Gonzalez	
Modesto	L.	Guggiari	
Silvio	Nunez		
Nelson	Segovia	
Ruffino	Palmerola	
Gloria	Escobar	
	
Fernando	A.	Lugo	
Carlos	A.	Filizzola	
Sixto	Pereira	
Esperanza	Martinez	
Oscar	H.	Richer	
Belarmino	Balbuena	
Victor	Bareiro	
Juan	De	Dios	Acosta	
Celsa	Ramirez	
Jose	Parra	
Ernesto	Benitez	
Alberto	R.	Alderete	
Carmen	Sanchez	
Saturnino	O.	Ruiz	
Ceferino	O.	Sostoa	
Adolfo	G.	Gimenez	
Estanislao	Barreto	
Juan	Carlos	Ayala	
Francisco	Garcia	
Pedro	B.	Espinoza	
	
Arnaldo	E.	Giuzzio	
Desiree	G.	Masi	
Pedro	Santa	Cruz	
Alcides	D.	Wood	
Jorgelina	Candia	
Sixto	R.	Escobar	
Gladys	Santa	Cruz	
Ricardo	A.	Lugo	
Gloria	E.	Granado	
Ramon	A.	Caballero	
Dilia	Z.	Albawi	
Alba	L.	Cabrera	
Ricardo	E.	Morales	
Blanca	Ayala	
Celina	Vera	
Felix	A.	Valdez	
Celsa	Quiñonez	
Eduardo	Chenu	
Antonio	Alfonzo	
Jose	Alcaraz	Salcedo	
	 	
Abstención	
Figure B1: Voting form - Closed-list.
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FERNANDO	A.	LUGO	CARLOS	A.	FILIZZOLA	SIXTO	PEREIRA	ESPERANZA	MARTINEZ	OSCAR	H.	RICHER	BELARMINO	BALBUENA	VICTOR	BAREIRO	JUAN	DE	DIOS	ACOSTA	CELSA	RAMIREZ	JOSE	PARRA	ERNESTO	BENITEZ	ALBERTO	R.	ALDERETE	CARMEN	SANCHEZ	SATURNINO	O.	RUIZ	CEFERINO	O.	SOSTOA	ADOLFO	G.	GIMENEZ	ESTANISLAO	BARRETO	JUAN	CARLOS	AYALA	FRANCISCO	GARCIA	PEDRO	B.	ESPINOZA	
ARNALDO	E.	GIUZZIO	DESIREE	G.	MASI	PEDRO	SANTA	CRUZ	ALCIDES	D.	WOOD	JORGELINA	CANDIA	SIXTO	R.	ESCOBAR	GLADYS	SANTA	CRUZ	RICARDO	A.	LUGO	GLORIA	E.	GRANADO	RAMON	A.	CABALLERO	DILIA	Z.	ALBAWI	ALBA	L.	CABRERA	RICARDO	E.	MORALES	BLANCA	AYALA	CELINA	VERA	FELIX	A.	VALDEZ	CELSA	QUIÑONEZ	EDUARDO	CHENU	ANTONIO	ALFONZO	JOSE	ALCARAZ	SALCEDO	
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Abstención 
Figure B2: Voting form - Open-list.
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Figure B3: Information booklet, pages 1 and 2.
Figure B4: Information booklet: control group.
Figure B5: Information booklet: information treatments.
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Appendix C - Descriptive Statistics and Addi-
tional Results
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Figure C1: Share of voters crossing each candidate
The figure presents the share of voters crossing out each of the candidates for the
Colorado-ANR and Liberal-PLRA Parties. Control, Info, and Info Social correspond
to the different treatment arms. INV (resp. No inv) indicates candidates who were
(resp. were not) involved in the Bogado immunity vote. In the upper panel, the
two outliers are Victor Bogado–candidate 17 on the Colorado list–and Juan Carlos
Galaverna–candidate 11, who had faced a sex tape scandal in the months before the
experiment took place.
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Table C1: Corruption
Information Information P-value
Control Corruption Corruption + Social C-TC C-TCS TC-TCS
Heard about corruption:
Heard about corruption case: 89 % 88 % 88 % 0.2251 0.3828 0.7756
Which type?
National level politicians 87 % 86 % 87 % 0.3885 0.7068 0.6782
Municipal/ local politicians 83 % 82 % 83 % 0.3199 0.7240 0.5831
Police 83 % 84 % 82 % 0.9682 0.5167 0.5503
Justice 82 % 78 % 79 % 0.0366 0.2590 0.4165
Health services 71 % 67 % 70 % 0.1290 0.7730 0.2903
Civil registry 42 % 37 % 39 % 0.0498 0.3560 0.3689
Corruption or electoral fraud 73 % 70 % 69 % 0.2312 0.0606 0.5536
Suffered personally the event: 20 % 20 % 17 % 0.8892 0.1138 0.1305
Corruption perception:
Politicians in general 91 % 91 % 92 % 0.9485 0.5257 0.5407
Justice 88 % 87 % 88 % 0.7090 0.6232 0.4527
Police 89 % 88 % 87 % 0.3599 0.1898 0.7330
Journalists 18 % 20 % 16 % 0.4520 0.1893 0.0716
Army 46 % 46 % 44 % 0.9416 0.3785 0.4832
Media owners 37 % 38 % 35 % 0.8322 0.3841 0.3464
Catholic Church 27 % 25 % 28 % 0.6034 0.4935 0.2958
Politicians in Government 92 % 90 % 92 % 0.2890 0.9429 0.3320
Politicians in Municipality 88 % 88 % 89 % 0.8470 0.7216 0.6327
On political parties:
Colorado -ANR 86 % 83 % 85 % 0.1098 0.9383 0.1934
Liberal - PLRA 88 % 87 % 87 % 0.3904 0.4452 0.9369
Frente Guasu´ - FG 70 % 67 % 66 % 0.2969 0.0946 0.5843
PDP 69 % 66 % 64 % 0.2123 0.0469 0.5209
Notes: The p-values presented are from the mean difference tests between C (Control), TC (Corruption) and TCS
(Corruption and social punishment) treatments. The panel “Perception about corruption” is measured in a scale of 1
“not corrupt” to 4 “very corrupt”. In terms of percentage, this variable takes the value 1 when the individual choose
3 or 4 and zero otherwise. The panel “Important factors to vote for a candidate” is measured on a scale of 1 “not
important” to 4 “very important”. In terms of percentage, this variable takes the value 1 when the individual choose
3 or 4 and zero otherwise.
Table C2: Perception on political corruption
Colorado-ANR Liberal-PLRA FG PDP
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Vote 2013 Colorado-ANR 82% 90% 76% 73%
Liberal-PLRA 94% 84% 64% 64%
FG 96% 96% 46% 53%
PDP 77% 92% 58% 25%
Total number of votes 1545 467 154 13
Notes: The table presents voters’ corruption perception for the different parties as a func-
tion of what they declare to have voted for in the 2013 presidential election. Vote 2013
refers to the vote in the 2013 Presidential election as stated by respondents. The perception
of corruption is measured on a scale of 1 “not corrupt” to 4 “very corrupt”. To translate
in percentages, this variable takes the value one when the individual choose 3 or 4 and zero
otherwise. The variable Total number of votes presents the votes per party as declared in
the sample for the presidential election of 2013.
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Table C3: Links to political parties
Treatment Treatment P-value
Control Corruption Corruption Social C-TC C-TCS TC-TCS
Affiliated Colorado -ANR 65 % 66 % 66 % 0.4655 0.5156 0.9491
Affiliated Liberal - PLRA 21 % 20 % 20 % 0.6449 0.5673 0.9194
Affiliated Small Parties 1 % 1 % 1 % 0.2880 0.4994 0.7163
Total affiliated to a party 86 % 86 % 86 % 0.8582 0.9644 0.9078
Identified with Colorado - ANR 32 % 29 % 31 % 0.2172 0.4917 0.6367
Identified with Liberal - PLRA 12 % 10 % 9 % 0.1642 0.0768 0.7261
Identified with Small Parties 3 % 4 % 3 % 0.6860 0.9629 0.6981
Total identified with a party 47 % 43 % 43 % 0.0606 0.0774 0.9317
Contributed money to the party: 4 % 3 % 4 % 0.2075 0.8427 0.1966
Important factors to vote for a candidate
Party Family tradition 47 % 48 % 46 % 0.6128 0.7637 0.4837
Will improve health system 90 % 91 % 90 % 0.7133 0.7807 0.5744
Will improve schools 91 % 92 % 91 % 0.6331 0.7582 0.4944
Will give me a job 60 % 59 % 57 % 0.7254 0.1998 0.4173
Will give money if I vote for him 7 % 8 % 5 % 0.1378 0.3504 0.0376
Will improve job opportunities 90 % 90 % 89 % 0.7235 0.6312 0.4692
Is religious 44 % 44 % 46 % 0.8095 0.5039 0.4289
Vote in 2013 presidential election
Voted Colorado - ANR in 2013 59% 60% 59% 0.6277 0.8831 0.7702
Voted Liberal - PLRA in 2013 19% 18% 20% 0.6613 0.6286 0.4231
Voted FG or PDP in 2013 4% 6% 5% 0.1890 0.5826 0.5212
Notes: The p-values presented are from the mean difference tests between C (Control), TC (Corruption) and TCS
(Corruption and social punishment) treatments. The panel “Important factors to vote for a candidate” is measured on
a scale of 1 “not important” to 4 “very important”. In terms of percentage, this variable takes the value 1 when the
individual chooses 3 or 4 and zero otherwise.
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Table C4: Candidates characteristics
Mean Sd Max Min
Total sample
Gender 22% 0.422 1 0
New in senate 31% 0.467 1 0
Years in congress 7.78 6.694 22 0
Elected 80% 0.405 1 0
Exposed 53% 0.506 1 0
Facebook 78% 0.417 1 0
Twitter 45% 0.504 1 0
ABC (Name) 3,179 3,525 14,325 0
ABC (Name + corruption) 450 1,599 9779 0
Colorado
Gender 15% 0.366 1 0
New in senate 40% 0.503 1 0
Years in congress 7 6.704 22 0
Elected 95% 0.224 1 0
Involved 60% 0.503 1 0
Facebook 80% 0.410 1 0
Twitter 45% 0.510 1 0
ABC (Name) 3,662 3,795 14,325 36
ABC (Name + corruption) 262 499 2269 7
Liberal
Gender 31% 0.479 1 0
New in senate 19% 0.403 1 0
Years in congress 9 6.768 22 0
Elected 65% 0.489 1 0
Involved 45% 0.510 1 0
Facebook 76% 0.437 1 0
Twitter 45% 0.510 1 0
ABC (Name) 2,643 3,221 12,702 0
ABC (Name + corruption) 658 2,280 9779 0
Notes: The variable ABC (Name) refers to the number
of times the candidates was mentioned in the website of
the newspaper ABC. The variable ABC (Name+Corruption)
refers to the number of times the candidate was mentioned
in topics of corruption in the website of the newspaper ABC.
Gender is a dummy that takes the value of 1 when the can-
didate is a woman. The variables Facebook and Twitter rep-
resent the percentage of candidates using these social net-
working sites.The variable Exposed is a dummy that takes
the value of 1 if that candidate was involved in the Bogado
voting scandal presented in the experiment.
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Table C5: Candidates characteristics by involvement in Bogado’s case
(1) (2) T-test
Not involved Involved Difference
Variable N Mean/SE N Mean/SE (1)-(2)
Gender (1=F, 0=M) 19 0.263
(0.104)
21 0.190
(0.088)
0.073
New in Senate (1=yes 0=no) 19 0.421
(0.116)
21 0.143
(0.078)
0.278*
Years in congress 19 5.105
(1.651)
21 8.714
(1.313)
-3.609*
Rank 19 12.316
(1.370)
21 8.857
(1.164)
3.459*
ABC corruption 19 -0.321
(0.099)
21 0.291
(0.276)
-0.612*
Facebook 19 0.526
(0.118)
21 0.905
(0.066)
-0.378***
Twitter 19 0.474
(0.118)
21 0.429
(0.111)
0.045
F-test of joint significance (F-stat) 3.121**
F-test, number of observations 40
Notes: The value displayed for t-tests are the differences in the means across the
groups. The value displayed for F-tests are the F-statistics. ***, **, and * indicate
significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. The table presents the comparison of
the candidate characteristics for the two main parties by whether they were involved
in the Bogado scandal senate immunity vote. The variable rank denotes the position
of the candidate in the party’s ballot. ABC corruption is an index of the exposure of
the candidate in the ABC newspaper. We use a count of these mentions between June
30, 2013, which is the date the new legislature took office, and March 30, 2015, the
end of the month immediately before our experimental roll-out.
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Table C7: Sample representativeness
Caaguazu´ Asuncio´n
Sample 2015 EPH Sample 2015 EPH
Individual characteristics
Gender 67.28% 53.00% 61.80% 50.00%
Education
Primary School 71.76% 68.81% 34.91% 32.80%
Basic Education 14.53% 12.73% 20.36% 29.26%
Middle Education 9.60% 12.69% 31.35% 36.58%
University 4.11% 13.38%
Household characteristics
HH Property Rights 89.58% 87.34% 80.16% 69.14%
House connected to water 64.00% 68.94% 99.00% 99.00%
Radio 80.62% 74.65% 94.31% 86.6%
TV 92.69% 87.35% 98.38% 97.7%
Fridge 82.54% 82.56% 96.25% 94.2%
Kitchen 63.53% 50.39% 93.67% 84.4%
Laundry 70.20% 69.03% 82.74% 80.9%
Video/DVD 25.05% 20.61% 52.17% 49.2%
Air Conditioning 11.43% 13.54% 53.72% 50.9%
TV Cable 18.01% 27.39% 51.65% 62.4%
Cellphone 84.37% 87.55% 83.65% 95.6%
Computer/Laptop 18.28% 13.54% 52.42% 50.9%
Electric Oven 29.71% 35.74% 57.01% 51.5%
Motorbike 66.54% 69.25% 31.03% 20.8%
Education and health services
Health Insurance
IPS 12.36% 12.19% 39.24% 31.95%
No insurance 84.89% 85.66% 51.52% 43.36%
Type of school
Public 96.50% 95.18% 68.71% 43.07%
Private 3.50% 4.82% 17.52% 37.46%
Subsidized 12.80% 19.47%
Notes: This table provide a comparison of the experimental sample with the national household
survey (EPH: Encuesta Permanente de Hogares 2015). The variable Gender is a dummy that
takes the value of 1 when the person is a woman. Regarding HH characteristics, the variable
“HH Property Rights” is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the person has the ownership of
the place he/she lives, and “House connected to water” takes the value of 1 when the house is
connected to local water system. On Health Insurance, IPS is a dummy that takes value 1 if the
person is covered by the Instituto Paraguayo de Salud. Type of school refers to the education
center of the children in the HH, if any.
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Table C8: Comparison of Asuncio´n and Caaguazu´ samples
Panel A: Individual characteristics
Caaguazu´ Asuncio´n Comparison
#Obs Mean Sd #Obs Mean Sd P-value Difference
Gender 1094 0.673 0.469 1547 0.618 0.486 0.004 0.055
Age 1094 45.279 16.182 1547 48.581 16.636 0.000 -3.302
17-35 years old 1094 0.331 0.471 1547 0.277 0.448 0.003 0.054
36-50 years old 1094 0.305 0.461 1547 0.271 0.445 0.058 0.034
51-65 years old 1094 0.227 0.419 1547 0.269 0.444 0.014 -0.042
More than 66 years old 1094 0.137 0.344 1547 0.182 0.386 0.002 -0.045
Marital Status
Single 1094 0.141 0.348 1547 0.178 0.383 0.010 -0.038
Married 1094 0.454 0.498 1547 0.383 0.486 0.000 0.072
Widow 1094 0.065 0.246 1547 0.092 0.289 0.012 -0.027
Separated 1094 0.071 0.257 1547 0.091 0.288 0.069 -0.020
Union 1094 0.269 0.444 1547 0.256 0.437 0.462 0.013
Language
Guaran´ı 1094 0.467 0.499 1547 0.073 0.260 0.000 0.394
Guaran´ı & Spanish 1094 0.514 0.500 1547 0.697 0.460 0.000 -0.183
Spanish 1094 0.019 0.137 1547 0.230 0.421 0.000 -0.211
Residence 1094 0.829 0.377 1547 0.876 0.330 0.001 -0.047
Education
Primary School 1094 0.718 0.450 1547 0.349 0.477 0.000 0.368
Basic Education 1094 0.145 0.353 1547 0.204 0.403 0.000 -0.058
Middle Education 1094 0.096 0.295 1547 0.314 0.464 0.000 -0.218
University 1094 0.041 0.199 1547 0.134 0.341 0.000 -0.093
Vote in 2013 1094 0.872 0.334 1547 0.976 0.153 0.000 -0.104
Democracy 1094 0.182 0.386 1547 0.127 0.333 0.000 0.055
Panel B: Household characteristics
Caaguazu´ Asuncio´n Comparison
#Obs Mean Sd #Obs Mean Sd P-value Difference
HH Property Rights 1094 0.896 0.306 1547 0.802 0.399 0.000 0.094
Land Property Rights 1094 0.080 0.272 1547 0.075 0.263 0.605 0.005
HH Size 1094 4.507 2.228 1547 4.515 2.382 0.931 -0.008
Dwealing Index 1094 1.320 1.496 1547 -0.951 1.322 0.000 2.271
HH Goods Index 1094 1.215 1.697 1547 -0.875 2.009 0.000 2.090
Notes: The variable Gender is a dummy that values 1 when the person is a woman. The variable Residence is a dummy and takes the
value of 1 if the person resides in the same locality for at least 5 years. Education refers to the highest grade reached. The variable “Vote
in 2013” is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the person voted in 2013. “Perception of democracy” takes the value of 1 if the person
thinks democracy functions good or very good in Paraguay.
Regarding HH characteristics, the variable “HH Property Rights” is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the person has the ownership
of the place he/she lives, “Land Property Rights” is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the person has the ownership of other asset such
as land. “HH Size” refers to the total number of members in the household. “Dwelling Index” is an index about the physical conditions of
the household; it is created using principal component analysis (PCA), taking into account the following variables: type of house, ceiling
of the house, floor, wall, access to water, bathroom type of drain, kitchen type of drain, and access to electricity. “HH Goods Index”
is a household asset index and it is created using PCA, taking into account whether the house has a radio, tv, fridge, kitchen, laundry,
video/dvd, boiler, air conditioning, cable tv, cellphone, PC/laptop, microwave, electric oven, car/van, truck, motorbike, or bike.
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Table C9: Between-parties vote decisions - Absten-
tion to missing
Panel A: Voter-Fixed effects
Colorado Liberal Small parties
(1) (2) (3)
Open system 0.0529*** 0.0283*** -0.0812***
(0.010) (0.007) (0.010)
Open*TC 0.0298* -0.0412*** 0.0114
(0.017) (0.013) (0.017)
Open*TCS 0.0323* -0.0094 -0.0230
(0.017) (0.013) (0.017)
Constant 0.5691*** 0.1635*** 0.2675***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Observations 4,546 4,546 4,546
Number of voter 2,415 2,415 2,415
R-squared 0.045 0.009 0.065
Panel B: Voter individual controls
Colorado Liberal Small parties
(4) (5) (6)
Open system 0.0565*** 0.0231+ -0.0796***
(0.020) (0.016) (0.017)
TC -0.0096 -0.0032 0.0129
(0.025) (0.019) (0.021)
TCS -0.0021 -0.0326* 0.0347*
(0.025) (0.019) (0.021)
Open*TC 0.0400 -0.0365 -0.0034
(0.035) (0.027) (0.029)
Open*TCS 0.0226 0.0056 -0.0282
(0.035) (0.027) (0.029)
Constant 0.5579*** 0.1844*** 0.2576***
(0.026) (0.020) (0.022)
Observations 4,546 4,546 4,546
Number of voter 2,415 2,415 2,415
R-squared 0.052 0.019 0.072
Notes: Individual controls include Married, Guaran´ı speaker,
gender, dwelling index, household goods index, age and edu-
cation. The specifications in Panel B include Interviewer-fixed
effects. The variables TC (Corruption) and TCS (Corruption
Social) correspond to the treatments. Robust standard errors
clustered at the district level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1, + p<0.15.
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Table C10: Between-parties vote decisions - multinomial Logit
Colorado Liberal Small parties
Open System 1.3652** 1.3734** 1.4056** 1.4124** 0.8402 0.8414
(0.172) (0.175) (0.211) (0.214) (0.123) (0.124)
.
Constant 3.7353*** 2.1698*** 1.1353 0.6625+ 1.6882*** 1.3506
(0.323) (0.495) (0.119) (0.183) (0.163) (0.356)
Voter controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 2570 2570 2570 2570 2570 2570
Notes: Multinomial logit, reference abstention. Odds ratios reported. Individual controls
include Married, Guaran´ı speaker, gender, dwelling index, household goods index, age and
education. The specifications also include interviewer- and district-fixed effects. Robust
standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1, + p<0.15
Table C11: Age (Cutoff = 47)
Colorado Liberal Small parties Abstention
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Open system 0.0536*** 0.0138 -0.0467*** -0.0208+
(0.016) (0.011) (0.014) (0.013)
Open*Age 0.0204 0.0203 -0.0359* -0.0049
(0.021) (0.015) (0.019) (0.018)
Open*TC 0.0032 -0.0105 -0.0101 0.0174
(0.027) (0.019) (0.024) (0.023)
Open*TC*Age 0.0326 -0.0406+ 0.0026 0.0054
(0.036) (0.025) (0.032) (0.031)
Open*TCS -0.0013 0.0188 -0.0317 0.0142
(0.027) (0.018) (0.024) (0.022)
Open*TCS*Age 0.0314 -0.0233 0.0042 -0.0124
(0.036) (0.025) (0.032) (0.031)
Constant 0.4923*** 0.1411*** 0.2352*** 0.1314***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Observations 5,185 5,185 5,185 5,185
Number of voter 2,609 2,609 2,609 2,609
R-squared 0.040 0.009 0.052 0.004
Notes: Robust standard errors (cluster district) in parentheses. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1, + p<0.15. Age is a dummy that takes value 1 when the
age is less than 47 years (mean of the variable Age). The specifications of the
tables include voter-fixed effects. The variables TC (Corruption) and TCS
(Corruption Social) correspond to the treatments.
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Table C12: Language
Colorado Liberal Small parties Abstention
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Open system 0.0853*** 0.0349*** -0.0709*** -0.0493***
(0.012) (0.008) (0.011) (0.010)
Open*Language -0.0853*** -0.0415** 0.0188 0.1080***
(0.025) (0.017) (0.022) (0.021)
Open*TC 0.0127 -0.0428*** 0.0062 0.0238
(0.020) (0.014) (0.018) (0.017)
Open*TC*Language 0.0289 0.0424 -0.0652* -0.0061
(0.043) (0.030) (0.038) (0.036)
Open*TCS 0.0161 -0.0039 -0.0305+ 0.0183
(0.021) (0.014) (0.019) (0.017)
Open*TCS*Language -0.0036 0.0418 0.0072 -0.0455
(0.042) (0.029) (0.038) (0.035)
Constant 0.4924*** 0.1411*** 0.2352*** 0.1313***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Observations 5,185 5,185 5,185 5,185
Number of voter 2,609 2,609 2,609 2,609
R-squared 0.046 0.011 0.051 0.020
Notes: Robust standard errors (cluster district) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1, + p<0.15. Language is a dummy that takes the value of 1 when
the people only speak Guaran´ı, and 0 when they speak Guaran´ı and Spanish. The
specifications of the tables include voter-fixed effects. The variables TC (Corruption)
and TCS (Corruption Social) correspond to the treatments.
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Table C13: Education
Colorado Liberal Small parties Abstention
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Open system 0.1182*** 0.0331*** -0.0875*** -0.0638***
(0.018) (0.013) (0.016) (0.015)
Open*Education -0.0797*** -0.0121 0.0315+ 0.0603***
(0.022) (0.015) (0.020) (0.019)
Open*TC 0.0037 -0.0526** 0.0143 0.0346
(0.032) (0.022) (0.028) (0.027)
Open*TC*Education 0.0268 0.0294 -0.0340 -0.0222
(0.039) (0.027) (0.035) (0.033)
Open*TCS -0.0405 0.0135 -0.0110 0.0379
(0.033) (0.023) (0.029) (0.027)
Open*TCS*Education 0.0822** -0.0100 -0.0266 -0.0456
(0.039) (0.027) (0.035) (0.033)
Constant 0.4924*** 0.1411*** 0.2352*** 0.1314***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Observations 5,185 5,185 5,185 5,185
Number of voter 2,609 2,609 2,609 2,609
R-squared 0.043 0.009 0.051 0.008
Notes: Robust standard errors (cluster district) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1, + p<0.15. Education is a dummy that takes the value of 1 when
Primary school and/or Basic education (from 7 to 9 grade) is reported as the max-
imum level of education, and 0 when respondents finished high school, technical
(middle) education and/or went to the university. The specifications of the tables
include voter-fixed effects. The variables TC (Corruption) and TCS (Corruption
Social) correspond to the treatments.
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Table C14: Awareness of information booklet news
Information Information P-value
Control Corruption Corruption + Social C-TC C-TCS TC-TCS
Total sample
Heard news on Futbol: 34 % 35 % 35 % 0.5371 0.6805 0.8617
Heard news on Movie: 84 % 84 % 86 % 0.8647 0.1425 0.2521
Heard news on Senators: 89 % 88 % 91 % 0.6516 0.1565 0.1010
Importance of news: (1:“not at all”- 4:“very important”)
Futbol 2.65 2.59 2.58 0.1729 0.1138 0.8535
Movie 3.09 3.04 3.06 0.1842 0.4578 0.5925
Senators 2.40 2.43 2.58 0.5527 0.0001 0.0044
Asuncio´n
Heard news on Futbol: 38% 39% 38% 0.7756 0.8764 0.7029
Heard news on Movie: 95% 95% 96% 0.9270 0.5493 0.6537
Heard news on Senators: 96% 95% 97% 0.5139 0.2918 0.1362
Importance of news: (1:“not at all”- 4:“very important”)
Futbol 2.79 2.69 2.65 0.1077 0.0227 0.5597
Movie 3.36 3.31 3.32 0.2915 0.4206 0.8135
Senators 2.43 2.41 2.60 0.7398 0.0070 0.0109
Caaguazu´
Heard news on Futbol: 28% 30% 31% 0.5030 0.3725 0.8438
Heard news on Movie: 68% 69% 73% 0.8069 0.1319 0.2650
Heard news on Senators: 78% 77% 81% 0.9055 0.2483 0.2627
Importance of news: (1:“not at all”- 4:“very important”)
Futbol 2.46 2.46 2.49 0.9175 0.6590 0.6358
Movie 2.71 2.66 2.70 0.3941 0.8072 0.5706
Senators 2.37 2.46 2.55 0.1361 0.0044 0.1924
Notes: The table shows the percentages of participants that had heard about the information provided in each
page of the information booklet. The p-values presented are from the mean difference tests between C (Control),
TC (Corruption) and TCS (Corruption and social punishment) treatments.
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